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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate the relationship between bank risk-return efficiency 
and bond spread priced in the primary market. Our study is based on a sample of European listed 
banks for the period 1996-2011. Applying a parametric frontier based on the Battese and Coelli (1993) 
model, we can compute risk-return efficiency score for each bank at each date. Compared to previous 
studies, we investigate the effectiveness of market discipline taking into account not only risk and 
return independently, but also the level of profitability for a given level of risk on the pricing of bond 
spread. We find that, over the complete sample period, bondholders require a higher spread from more 
inefficient banks. A closer analysis actually shows that market discipline is not effective during sound 
economic period, but market investors comes to discipline banks during distressed economic period by 
pricing lower spread to more efficient banks. 
JEL Classification: G21, G24, G28, G32 
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1. Introduction  
 
The increasing size and complexity of the financial system has made the regulation growing sharply 
through years, accounting for an increased desire to control banking activities and to avoid systemic 
crises in protecting bank safety. In particular pillar 3 of Basel II Accords suggests to reinforce the 
action of market discipline channels by strengthening information disclosure
3
. The reform aims to 
provide more information to markets actors, such as bondholders or shareholders, which can then exert 
a direct monitoring and influence on banks. Indeed market investors incorporate their evaluation of a 
bank condition in its assessment (through for example its security price or its bond spread). This 
monitoring may prompt firm managers to take corrective measures to counteract adverse changes 
(Bliss and Flannery (2002)). While market discipline has become an important tool to complement 
banking supervision, its effectiveness as a prudential mechanism is still under assessment. The present 
financial crisis, started in 2007, shows that market discipline was insufficient to limit excessive risk-
taking by banks. 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically test whether bondholders exert a discipline on how banks 
manage their level of risk with regard to their profitability. More precisely do bondholders discipline 
banks that mismanaged their risk? Does the bond spread account for the bank risk – return efficiency? 
Empirical studies on bond spread evaluate whether the market reacts to bank risk taking, but they do 
not take into account its risk management. These studies consider the effect of the level of risk on 
bond spread, and expect that a higher level of risk should induce a higher spread. In this study we do 
not only consider that the level of risk should impact bond spread, but rather the efficiency of risk 
taken by banks, that is we take into account the couple risk-return. In other words, we assume that the 
market is considering the bank efficiency to price its debt. The market will not only penalize high 
risks; it will sanction bad efficiency that is banks which do not optimally manage their risks, even if 
the level of risk is low
4
. We aim to assess whether the market takes into account the efficiency of the 
couple risk/return and not only risk taking. Let’s consider two different banks which take the same 
level of risk: we consider that the first one is efficient and it therefore belongs to the efficient frontier. 
The second bank on the other hand has a level of profitability that is lower than the first one. This 
bank, independently of the level of risk taken, should have a higher bond spread than the first one.  In 
other words, market investors will react and send a signal to the bank by requiring an increased bond 
spread. The bank has to improve the efficiency of the couple risk/return either by improving its risk 
management process, that is increasing its profitability, or by decreasing its degree of risk given its 
level of return. Therefore the efficiency of the management of the bank, through its choice of risk and 
return, should be considered while assessing market discipline. Our research question is then to 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
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 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999) 
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 It means that market discipline forces banks to shift their portfolio in order to reach an optimal risk-return frontier. 
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examine how banks’ risk-return efficiency affects their financial cost measured by the spread at the 
issuance of unsecured bonds.  
In the literature, a large number of studies show that subordinated debt or unsecured bonds are a good 
instrument of market discipline (BGFRS (1999), Evanoff and Wall (2001) and Evanoff et al. (2011)). 
Among them, banks’ bond spread is widely used to evaluate market discipline as its level reflects the 
additional compensation required by bondholders to hold the bond instead of a default-free 
government bond (Elton et al. (2001)). In this paper we add to the literature by further studying the 
effectiveness of market discipline while including the risk-return efficiency as a determinant of bond 
spread. Previous papers have empirically examined to which extend bank risk and profitability impact 
bond spread of banks. They evaluate the relationship between bond spread and bank risk 
characteristics and try to show that bondholders ask for higher premium from riskier banks and less 
profitable banks
5
. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) study if there is evidence of market discipline over the 
period 1983-1991 on US banks. They used an option-adjusted subordinated debt spread extracted from 
the secondary market and examine the impact of bank risk on the spread. They find that market 
discipline becomes effective when regulators stopped protecting large bank holding companies’ 
creditors. The effect of the profitability measure on bond spread is ambiguous as its coefficient can 
have a positive or a negative sign. Morgan and Stiroh (2001) analyze the existence of market 
discipline for US banks and BHCs on a large panel of bonds issued between 1993 and 1998. They 
found that market discipline is effective, more precisely they found that riskier banks and less 
profitable banks have a higher bond spread. They also show that bond spreads are sensitive to assets 
bank portfolio. Jagtiani et al. (2002) test the relationship between secondary market bond spread and 
US banking risk. They find that risk factors affect the bond spread either for BHCs and banks. They 
also found that profitable and risk variables are significant with respectively a positive and negative 
sign. Sironi (2003) studies the relation between the primary bond spread and risk over 1991-2000 and 
for a sample of 290 banks issues. He finds a negative sign for the profitability variable but no 
relationship between the spread and accounting risk measures. However through ownership Sironi 
shows that risk matters as state-own banks have a lower spread than the other banks. Pennacchi and 
Iannotta (2012) are interested in the systemic risk as a component of bond spread. On a sample of 
3,924 bonds issued by US, Japan or European banks over 1999-2010, they show that bondholders 
sanction banks which take excessive systematic risk. They do not control for profitability. Pop and 
Pop (2012) use a quantile regression on a panel of 521 bonds issued between 1995 and 2002 to test 
whether market investors are tougher with high-risk bank and show that bond investors ask for a 
higher bond spread from banks that are taking higher level of risk.  
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
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In this paper, we extend the previous literature by considering the risk-return efficiency of banks while 
assessing the effectiveness of market discipline. In the aforementioned papers, authors show that the 
pricing of bond spread reflect the bank level of risk, but no one is addressing the question of banks 
risk-return management impact on bond spread. We add a new variable, the risk-return efficiency 
score, as a determinant of the bond spread equation instead of introducing profitability and risk 
components independently. We work on a set of 47 listed European banks that issued 1585 unsecured 
bonds between 2001 and 2011. Our empirical analysis aim to test our research hypothesis, that is 
whether the management of risk, measured by a risk-return efficiency score, is taken into account in 
the pricing of bond spread. We undertake this study in two steps. First, we use a stochastic parametric 
frontier methodology to determine the bank efficiency in the management of their risk-taking. In the 
second step, we model the bond spread equation with the common variables used in the literature to 
which we add the risk-return efficiency score as a determinant of the bond spread equation instead of 
introducing profitability and risk components independently.  
Overall our results suggest that a lower risk-return efficiency score, i.e. an increased inefficiency, is 
associated with a higher bond spread. However if we consider more closely this finding, we show a 
change over the period in the behavior of market investors. Before the financial crisis bondholders are 
seems to prefer risk-taking behavior. On the contrary since the beginning of the crisis, market 
investors required from banks higher bond spread not only when risk increases but also when 
inefficiency increases. More generally, we show that during time of distressed economic period (low 
GDP growth), market discipline is effective. Market investors require higher bond spread to more 
risky and more inefficient banks. Such a requirement disappears during sound economic period.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and sample, and 
provides some descriptive statistics. Section 3 describes the methodology to calculate the risk-return 
efficiency score and to estimate the determinant of bond spread, while our results and robustness 
checks are presented and discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Data, sample, and variable characteristics  
 
2.1. Data and sample 
"
Our sample contains investment, commercial and saving banks from 14 European countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. Initially 218 banks were identified in the FitchIBCA Bankscope 
database. The whole set of accounting data come from Bankscope. After collecting daily stock market 
data from Datastream, we applied a criterion of trading regularity to these European publicly and 
traded bank set, which leads us to remove banks for which trading prices remain constant over more 
than 30% of the whole trading days over the period 1996 – 2011. Our final sample consists of 166 
banks. This dataset is used to estimate the risk-return efficiency scores over the period 2001 – 2011.  
5"
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For this bank set, we identify within Bloomberg database bonds satisfying the following criteria: we 
only include standard bonds
6
 issued between 2001 and 2011 with fixed coupon rate, no-early 
redemption (bullet) and no option features (non-callable, non-perpetual, non-putable, non-sinkable and 
non-convertible)
 7
. All these bonds are unsecured or subordinated. We indifferently include matured 
and non-matured bonds. Bonds should be rated, at the immediate neighborhood of issuance, by at least 
two credit rating agencies (Moody’s, Standards & Poors and Fitch). We exclude issues with a very 
short maturity and perpetual bonds that do not have a maturity date in order to calculate a spread
8
.  
Merging the two dataset leads to a final sample including 1,585 bonds issues originated by 47 banks. 
The number of banks and bond issues from each country are shown in Table 1.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
2.2. Bond spread, rating and descriptive statistics  
 
Our study is based on primary market spreads as Morgan and Stiroh (2001), Sironi (2003), Iannotta et 
al. (2011), and Pennacchi and Iannotta (2012). Bond yields come from Bloomberg Database. We 
compute bond spread, SPREAD, !as the difference between the bond yield at issuance and the implicit 
yield of a same currency and maturity Treasury bond
9
. The yield of the risk free benchmark is 
interpolated, for a given maturity, as in Morgan and Stiroh (1999), Jagtiani et al. (2002) and Sironi 
(2003). For bonds issued in a currency prior the Euro, the spread is calculated using a Treasure 
security issued in the same currency and with the same maturity as the bond.   
Beside bond spreads, we have collected detailed information about issues (issue date, maturity, 
amount issued, currency coupon rate, ratings by the three main rating agencies etc.) and about issuers 
(Moody’s and Fitch rating at issuance, ownership structure etc.). For each bank, we gather two kinds 
of rating: traditional rating (Moody's Issuer Rating and Fitch Long term Issuer Default Rating) and 
solidity/individual rating (Moody's Bank Financial Strength Rating (MBFS) and Fitch's Bank 
Individual Rating (FBIR)). Financial strength ratings are different from traditional ratings as they 
exclude a potential influence of a safety net effect. They show the true financial condition of banks 
without any regard to safety net effects. We convert ratings into numeric value according to rating 
scales available in appendix A1. Higher numerical value means lower rating and thus higher risk as 
perceived by rating agencies. We create three variables: RATINGBOND is the average of bond ratings 
for each bond at each date; likewise RATINGTRAD is the average of the issuer traditional ratings from 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
6
 We choose traditional plain-vanilla bonds in order to slip option, fiscal and liquidity premium component of bond spread 
and keep mainly the risk premium part (see Elton et al. (2001)). 
7
 As in Sironi (2003), Iannotta (2008) and Jagtiani et al. (2002) 
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 When maturity is close to a week or more than fifty years, we do not have a value for the risk free rate and thus we cannot 
compute bond spreads.  
9
 As extreme value of bond spread exist, we winsorized it.  
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Moody’s and Fitch, and, RATINGSOLID is the average of bank individual/financial ratings. Table 2 
reports information on spread, maturity and rating classes through years. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Risk-return efficiency score: a stochastic frontier approach 
"
3.1.1. Risk-return frontier 
 
We postulate that some banks do not manage their risk - return choices as efficiently as it would be 
possible on the basis of what can be observed.  These banks are risk-return inefficient because their 
trade-off between risk and return is not optimal as regard with the so called, period contingent, best 
practice frontier (BPF) and can be improved. For a given period, this BPF can be computed using two 
main methods: the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) or the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). We 
prefer SFA as, unlike Data Envelopment, it decomposes the distance to the BPF into two components: 
an inefficiency part and a stochastic one, avoiding to interpret what would be a simple stochastic 
shock as a full inefficiency gap. The estimation of the risk-return BPF allows us to provide, at each 
date and for each bank, a risk-return efficiency score which summarizes the relative position of the 
bank compared to the BPF measure of bank risk-return efficiency. The efficiency score takes its 
values between zero and 1; as the score gets closer to 1, the more efficient the bank will be.   
We measure the bank's profitability as the return on average assets (ROA)
10
. We choose ROA rather 
than ROE (returns on average equity) as, for a given level of risk, a fall of ROE from the BPF may 
equally result from a true profitability downturn (which should be disciplined) or from a rise of the 
capital ratio (which should not). It should be noticed that the profitability measure is available at an 
annual frequency. To measure bank risk, we consider a market-based indicator. This market based 
measure is calculated using daily stock market data. RTOTi,t is the standard deviation of daily bank 
stock returns Ri,t computed on a moving window of 261 quoted days [t-261, t], see Baele et al. (2011) 
or De Jonghe et al. (2012).This risk indicator is available at a daily frequency. As the profitability 
variable is available at an annual frequency, the high frequency data for bank risk have been averaged 
for each year from 1996 to 2011. As DeYoung et al. (2001-b), we rescaled our return and risk 
measures by their respective standard deviations.  
As our aim is not to explain the inefficiency level for bank i at time t but to analyze the effect of this 
inefficiency on the pricing of bond spreads, we compute the risk-return stochastic frontier and the 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
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 ROA is regularly used as measure of profitability in the spread equation see Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Morgan and 
Stiroh (1999), Deyoung et al. (2001-a), Jagtiani et al. (2002), Sironi (2003), Evanoff et al. (2011), Pop and Pop (2012) 
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induced efficiency scores on the basis of Battese and Coelli (1993), where the BPF is based on the 
equation: 
 
i ,t i ,t i ,t
ROA RTOTα β ε= + +  (1) 
 with: 
i,t i,t i,t
uε = ν −   
 
ROAi,t is the profitability measure of bank i at time t and RTOTi,t is the risk measure of bank i at time t. 
Equation (1) looks like a production function were risk would be the input variable and profitability 
the output. The error term 
it
ε !is time and bank-specific and is equal to
i,t i,t
- uν . 
i ,t
ν "is a two-sided 
random component reflecting exogenous shocks for which banks cannot be accountable from an 
inefficiency point of view. 
i ,t
ν "is assumed to be normally distributed 
i ,t
ν ∼ Ν(0, σν). The inefficiency 
component
i ,t
u is assumed to be drawn from a half normal distribution with zero mean and variance σ2: 
 
it
u  ∼ Ν+(0, σ)  
 
The sample log-likelihood (see Battese and Coelli (1993)) is maximized with regard to α, β, (σν2 + σ2) 
and a parameter γ, equal to σ2 / (σν2 + σ2), which measures the relative contribution of the inefficiency 
component to the determination of the volatility of 
i,t
ε . We used the SFA function of the FRONTIER 
package to implement this estimation with R software.  
 
3.1.2. Risk – return efficiency score  
 
Once the parameters of the model have been estimated, we can calculate the estimated efficiency 
scores, for each bank at each date. These efficiency scores will next be used as a determinant of bond 
spreads. Therefore, we chose to not estimate them directly on the whole sample period 1996 - 2011, 
even if Battese and Coelli (1993) allow such a possibility: indeed, this procedure would 
inconveniently suggest that market investors hold the whole future information when they have to 
evaluate bank efficiency at time t.  
To estimate our efficiency scores, we prefer to estimate the BPF given all past information we hold. 
We estimate our first score in 2001, using a BPF based on all the information available between 1996 
and 2001. Then to estimate the efficiency score in 2002 we use a BPF based on information available 
between 1996 and 2002 and so on. Nonetheless, while we calculate our frontiers, we observe that the 
theoretical positive relationship between return and risk is altered through time. More precisely, since 
the beginning of the financial crisis, we either have no relationship or a negative one. Such a result can 
be explained by the realization of risk during this strong distressed period, high-risk profile bank end 
up with a low profitability. Figure 1 in appendix A2 shows the evolution of our BPF through years.   
To compute our efficiency score, we cannot keep a BPF with a negative slop. Indeed, let’s suppose we 
do so (like the 1996 – 2011 BPF). Bank A on figure 1 would get a better score, that is closer to 1, than 
8"
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bank B, when obviously an investor would prefer bank B, which offers the same profitability as bank 
A but for a lower risk. Therefore, we assume that investors, bondholders, do not consider the frontier 
obtained during the financial crisis as BPF. To calculate these risk-return efficiency scores during the 
year of the financial crisis, we suppose that investors refer to the last BPF with a positive relationship 
between risk and return (1996 – 2008).  
Table 3 hereafter resumes some descriptive statistics for the estimates of the stochastic frontier 
parameters and Table 4 presents the mean efficiency scores through years. Summary statistics for the 
profitability and the risk measures as for the risk-return efficiency score are presented in Table 5.  
 
[Insert Tables 3, 4 and 5 about here] 
 
3.2. The spread equation  
"
 
To determine whether bond market investors discipline banks for risk-return inefficiency, we estimate 
different equations of bond spread' determinants on the basis of the following general specification: 
 
 !"#$%&! = ! + !!"#$%!(!),!(!) + !"!(!),!(!) + !!! + !"!(!) + !! (2) 
 
The dependent variable !"#$%&!  is the spread at issuance for bond j, issued at time t by the issuer i 
of bond j. The spread is the difference, in basis point, between the bond yield at issuance and the yield 
of a same currency and maturity Treasury Bond (Jagtiani et al.(2002))
11
. Yi(j),t(j) is a vector of 
interpolated bank-specific accounting variables for bank i at time t
12
, Xj is a vector of bond j 
characteristics and Zt(j) is a vector of control variables that may affect bond spread. Table 6 provides a 
short description and some general descriptive statistics of these explanatory variables. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here]  
 
SCOREi(j),t(j) is the interpolated value of the risk-return efficiency score at issuance (day t). We assume 
that the market is able to evaluate the bank risk-return inefficiency and that it prices bonds 
accordingly. LIQDEPi(j),t(j) is the ratio of liquid assets to customers deposits and short term funding 
(Sironi (2003) and Pop and Pop (2012)). We expect a negative sign, more liquid bank should be safer 
and thus the spread should be lower. LEVi(j),t(j) is the ratio of total liabilities to total equity (Flannery 
and Sorescu (1996), Jagtiani et al. (2002), and Sironi (2003)). Traditionally, a higher leverage ratio 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
11
 For bonds issued in a currency prior Euro, the spread is calculated using a Treasure Bond issued in this currency with the 
same maturity as the issue. 
12
 The bank-specific accounting variables !!(!),!(!)  as well as the risk-return efficiency scores have to be time-interpolated. 
These variables are observed (or computed) at December 31
th
 of each year and for each bank issuer whereas bonds can be 
issued at any time during this year. For an issue j at time t = March 31
th
, 2007, the matching value for Yi(j),t(j) will be 0.75 × 
Yi,2006 + 0.25 × Yi,2007.  
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means a higher default risk leading to a higher spread. TAMAXi(j),t(j) is the ratio of the total assets of the 
issuer bank to the total assets of the largest bank in the year sample of the issuance date (Sironi 
(2003)). 
The vector Xj of bond specific characteristics includes: MATURITYj which is the time left until the 
maturity of the issue, AMOUNTj which is the natural logarithm of the amount of the issue in euros 
(Morgan and Stiroh (2001), Sironi (2002), Sironi (2003) and Iannotta et al. (2011)). We expect 
respectively a positive and a negative sign. SPLITj is a measure of disagreement between bond ratings 
of Moody’s and Fitch rating agencies (Morgan (1998) and Morgan (2002)). As a measure of bank 
opacity, we expect a positive sign: a high split rating means that rating agencies quite disagree in their 
notation, which can be interpreted as a signal for relative bank opacity. 
RISK  may be alternatively a measure of the bond risk or the bank risk: RATINGBONDj, the average of 
available bond ratings for each bond at each date; RATINGTRADi(j),t(j) the average of the issuer 
traditional ratings from Moody’s and Fitch, RATINGSOLIDi(j),t(j) the average of bank 
individual/financial ratings and, at last,  RTOTi(j),t(j) the bank total portfolio risk. In all case, we expect a 
positive sign as a higher rating corresponds, by convention, to a higher risk (Sironi (2003) and Iannotta 
et al. (2011)).  
At last we control for some additional variables Zt(j) that may affect the bond spread. As the bond 
spread may vary over the business cycle, we add a CYCLEt(j) variable which captures the influence of 
economic conditions see Evanoff et al. (2011). It was computed using a HP filter on the basis of the 
quarterly GDP index of the country of bank i. DUMCRISISt(j) is a dummy equals to 1 when the 
issuance date is either 2008, 2009, 2010 or 2011; 0 otherwise. As this dummy may capture the effects 
of financial crisis, we expect a positive sign. The vector of control variables also contains dummies
13
: 
DUMCOUNTRYt(j) and DUMCURRENCYt(j) see Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Sironi (2003) and 
Iannotta et al. (2011). These dummies control for constant differences across banks issuers such as 
cross-country variation and liquidity effects that may affect bond spreads.  
 
4. Regression results 
"
We estimate the coefficients of the independent variables presented in equation (2) by applying  the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator with heteroskedasticity - robust standard errors, 
White correction
 
(see (Podpiera and Weill (2008))
 14
.  
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
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 Some dummies are dropped to avoid collinearity problem in the sample data.  
14
 We wondered about the exogeneity of variables that may be adjusted by managers in reaction to the level of spread (LEV, 
LIQDEP and RTOT). This problem of recursive causality will biased the OLS estimates. We undertook the Hausman test 
which is conclusive (this test is available upon request). To avoid endogeneity, we preferred to estimate the spread equation 
based on GMM estimator (see Arellano and Bond (1991)). Event though, we provide in Appendix A3 an estimation with the 
OLS method as robustness check. Results are similar. 
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Table 7 reports coefficients of GMM regressions over the whole sample period 2001 - 2011. While 
estimating equation (2), we use different proxies of risk, which appear in the different columns. 
 
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
 
Concerning risk measures, the bond rating variable (column 3) is the only one significant. The sign is 
positive as we expected: when this variable increases, that is the mean bond rating downgrades, the 
level of bond spread increases. Our leverage ratio variable (LEV) has a positive and significant 
coefficient as expected. A higher leverage indicates a higher default risk, thus bondholders require a 
higher bond spread. The sign of the size variable (TAMAX) is also consistent with our expectation. 
Investors reward large bank as they consider these banks as less risky than small ones. MATURITY 
has a highly significant positive sign indicating that bondholders require a higher bond spread while 
time to redemption increases. The negative sign of the AMOUNT variable suggests that large bonds 
benefit from a liquidity effect (see Morgan and Stiroh (2001)).  When the SPLIT variable is 
significant, it is associated with a positive sign. This suggests that a high disagreement between bond 
ratings is associated with a higher bond spread. Market investors penalize bank opaqueness. The 
CYCLE variable has a positive significant coefficient. This result is quite surprising as it suggests that 
during growth periods the spread increases. The liquidity ratio (LIQDEP) is negative when significant. 
Higher bank liquidity may improve banks safety and bondholders reward those banks by requiring a 
smaller spread.  The dummy which identifies the financial crisis (DUMCRISIS) is positive and 
significant, indicating an increase of bond spreads during this period. Finally our risk-return efficiency 
score variable (SCORE) is negative and significant whatever specification is retained. This result 
seems to indicate that market investors discipline banks as the spread on bonds they issue increases 
when their risk-return inefficiency increases. The market reacts to banks’ risk management, to banks’ 
performance. 
 
We further investigate our results by analyzing the determinants of bond spreads before and during the 
financial crisis. Results are reported Table 8.  
 
[Insert Table 8 around here] 
 
Our estimations here show an important result: market investors behave differently before and during 
the financial crisis. Indeed before the financial crisis, 2001-2007, the coefficient of the risk-return 
efficiency score is mostly positive and significant whereas during the financial crisis 2008-2011, it 
remains negative and significant. It seems like before 2008, market investors do not take into account 
the risk-return efficiency of banks into their discipline even going to reward them for being inefficient. 
Our results could indicate that bondholders were not sensitive to the risk management of banks before 
the financial crisis. They could even suggest that bondholders prefer risk-taking profile. On the 
11"
"
contrary, after 2008, that is during the financial crisis, we find that when the risk-return efficiency 
decreases, the level of spread required increases, and we also find that an increase in the risk taken is 
penalized by a higher spread. In other words, market discipline seems to be effective during the 
financial crisis but not before. 
To further analyze this result, we also separate our sample depending on economic condition: we 
consider on the one hand sound economic period (relative high growth period in Europe, 2001, 2004-
2007) and on the other hand distressed economic period (2002-2003, 2008-2011). Results are shown 
in Appendix A4. Our findings corroborate and even strengthen our previous results: market discipline, 
appreciated by the risk-return efficiency score and the risk measure, is effective during distressed 
periods but not during economic sound ones. 
"
5. Conclusion  
"
Market discipline is an important tool of prudential supervision especially as the European banking 
system become more complex. Supervisors incorporate bank market signal in order to reinforce and 
enhance their indirect influence on the level of bank risk. Previous studies have found that 
bondholders are able to distinguish between different bank risk profiles and are able to discipline bank 
risk-taking by requiring a higher bond spread when the level of risk is excessive. None of these studies 
take into account the impact of risk management on bond spreads. In this paper we investigate whether 
market actors penalize banks that not optimally manage their risks: not only the level of risk matters, 
but also its management. This is the reason why we consider both risk and return and the efficiency of 
this couple to study market discipline. Our research question is then to examine how the risk-return 
efficiency affects bank financial cost measured through the spread at issuance of unsecured bonds.  
 
To answer this question we calculate a risk-return efficiency score thanks to a parametric efficient 
frontier developed by Battese and Coelli (1993). We then integrate it as a determinant of the bond 
spread equation instead of considering profitability and risk components independently. Our results 
show over the sample period that a lower risk-return efficiency score is associated with a higher bond 
spread. Market actors may distinguish banks’ performance in their management of risk and penalize 
the inefficient one by requiring a higher cost of funding. But while deepening our results, we show 
that this result does not hold before the financial crisis. They even suggest that market investors tend 
to prefer risk-taking banks, and charge lower bond spreads during sound economic period. On the 
contrary, market discipline becomes effective during distressed economic period: bondholders require 
higher bond spreads from more risky banks and more risk-return inefficient ones. 
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Table 1: Number of banks and issues by country  
Geographic 
country 
Panel A : 166 banks (1996-2011) Panel B : 47 banks (1585 bonds, 2001-2011) 
Number of 
banks 
Average total assets  
(€ million) 
Number of 
banks 
Number 
of issues 
Average total assets  
(€ million) 
AUSTRIA 5 48,448.05 2 63 16.415,81 
BELGIUM 1 843.70 0 0 - 
BRITAIN 9 78,320.55 5 54 137,969.68 
DENMARK 19 20,538.28 3 119 357,401.14 
FRANCE 20 184,678.73 6 242 1,125,982.00 
GERMANY 20 203,113.87 8 564 646,967.75 
GREECE 15 20,653.09 0 0 - 
IRELAND 3 83,938.82 3 198 130,267.29 
ITALY 38 59,246.76 7 151 603,124.95 
LUXEMBOURG 4 29,712.92 2 17 55,449.49 
NETHERLANDS 4 186,500.70 1 40 26,357.49 
PORTUGAL 5 43,332.93 2 9 89,651.82 
SPAIN 17 89,798.30 5 17 210,020.17 
SWEDEN 6 88,589.54 3 111 204,719.05 
Total 166 88,045.94 47 1585 529,955.36 
The average total assets are expressed in million euros. This is the average of bank total assets resident in each country over 
the considered period. Source: Authors’ calculation using data from Bankscope and Bloomberg. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary characteristics on bond issues per year (2001-2011) 
Panel B : 1585 bonds 
Issue 
Year 
Number 
of issues 
Spread 
Mean 
Maturity 
(years) 
Mean 
Amount of 
issue 
(€ billion) 
Average 
ISSUE 
traditional 
rating 
Average 
ISSUER 
traditional 
rating 
Average 
ISSUER 
financial 
strength rating 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
2001 98 117.01 186.04 6.24 1,795.30 4.28 4.10 5.22 
2002 120 96.94 177.02 4.73 311.48 4.74 4.68 6.03 
2003 107 45.84 108.71 4.54 132.96 5.00 4.71 5.87 
2004 163 12.71 97.26 3.96 325.28 4.52 4.50 5.79 
2005 140 29.27 144.45 4.55 514.28 4.56 4.54 5.09 
2006 120 96.56 179.09 3.40 313.58 4.86 4.71 5.16 
2007 219 69.04 166.34 3.29 1,674.97 4.05 4.04 5.48 
2008 185 109.99 117.07 4.10 665.37 3.85 4.39 6.29 
2009 230 125.92 112.13 3.61 832.48 3.21 4.76 7.17 
2010 113 126.41 131.29 5.77 890.58 4.68 5.63 7.32 
2011 90 122.81 102.83 4.54 1,047.11 5.21 5.45 6.76 
Total 1585 86.59 138.38 4.43 498.25 4.45 4.68 6.01 
SPREAD is the difference in basis point between the bond yield at issuance and the yield of a same currency and maturity Treasury 
bond. All statistics are calculated at issuance. Our sample includes 1585 bonds issued by 47 different European banks. MATURITY 
is the mean number of years until the bond redemption. AMOUNT of bond is expressed in billion Euros. Average ISSUE traditional 
rating is the mean of bond ratings between numerical value of Moody’s, Fitch and Standard’s & Poors traditional ratings as shown in 
Appendix A1. Average ISSUER traditional rating is a comparable measure applied to banks. Average ISSUER financial strength 
rating is the mean rating between numerical value of Fitch IBCA individual rating and Moody’s bank financial strength rating.  
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Table 3: Summary of stochastic frontier estimates parameters (panel A sample, 1996–2011) 
 
Frontier equation 
Nb. 
Obs. 
Log 
Likelihood 
γ σ2 
1996 - 2001 
ROA = 0.58*** + 0.23***.RTOT 
               (0.00)         (0.00) 
630 -861.43 
0.61*** 
(0.00) 
1.51*** 
(0.00) 
1996 - 2002 
ROA = 0.65*** + 0.18***.RTOT 
                (0.00)         (0.00) 
743 -1,009.21 
0.66*** 
(0.00) 
1.58*** 
(0.00) 
1996 - 2003 
ROA = 0.70*** + 0.15***.RTOT 
                (0.00)         (0.00) 
853 -1,166.45 
0.63*** 
(0.00) 
1.55*** 
(0.00) 
1996 – 2004 
ROA = 0.74*** + 0.13***.RTOT 
                (0.00)         (0.00) 
960 -1,321.45 
0.59*** 
(0.00) 
1.51*** 
(0.00) 
1996 - 2005 
ROA = 0.74*** + 0.12***RTOT 
                (0.00)         (0.00) 
1,068 -1,481.00 
0.53*** 
(0.00) 
1.46*** 
(0.00) 
1996 - 2006 
ROA = 0.71*** + 0.13***.RTOT 
                (0.00)         (0.00) 
1,174 -1,637.30 
0.48*** 
(0.00) 
1.40*** 
(0.00) 
1996 - 2007 
ROA = 0.74*** + 0.10***.RTOT 
                (0.00)         (0.00) 
1,276 -1,785.27 
0.47*** 
(0.00) 
1.38*** 
(0.00) 
1996 - 2008 
ROA = 0.76*** + 0.08***.RTOT 
                (0.00)         (0.00) 
1,374 -1,925.90 
0.45*** 
(0.00) 
1.37*** 
(0.00) 
1996 - 2009 
ROA = 0.87*** + 0.00.RTOT 
                (0.00)         (0.92) 
1,464 -2,057.10 
0.42*** 
(0.00) 
1.34*** 
(0.00) 
1996 - 2010 
ROA = 0.91*** - 0.03.RTOT 
                (0.00)         (0.23) 
1,547 -2,174.02 
0.41*** 
(0.00) 
1.32*** 
(0.00) 
1996 - 2011 
ROA = 0.91*** - 0.03.RTOT 
                (0.00)         (0.22) 
1,552 -2,181.05 
0.41*** 
(0.00) 
1.32*** 
(0.00) 
P-values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. γ is equal to 
σ2 / (σν2 + σ2) and σ2 is the variance of the inefficiency component uit 
 
Table 4: Mean efficiency score and corrected score (panel A sample, 2001–2011) 
 Mean Efficiency 
Nb. Obs.  “Normal” Score 
 ROA-RTOT 
“Corrected” Score 
ROA-RTOT 
2001 0.53 0.53 115 
2002 0.52 0.52 113 
2003 0.54 0.54 110 
2004 0.56 0.56 107 
2005 0.59 0.59 108 
2006 0.61 0.61 106 
2007 0.60 0.60 102 
2008 0.56 0.56 98 
2009 0.58 0.15 90 
2010 0.59 0.09 83 
2011 0.62 0.49 5 
Total 0.56 0.48 1037 
“Normal” score and “corrected” score only differ for 2009, 2010 and 2011. Here, to calculate the “normal” score, we 
refer to a BPF with a negative slop whereas the “corrected” score is computed starting from the 1996 – 2008 BPF, the 
last BPF with a positive and significant relationship between risk and return.  
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for variables used to estimate the optimal frontier and for the risk-return 
efficiency score (panel A sample, 1996 – 2011) 
Name 
Mean 
% 
Stand. Dev. 
% 
Minimum 
% 
Maximum 
% 
Nb. Obs. 
ROA  0.86 3.36 -37.34 29.32 1,861 
RTOT  2.22 1.58 0.02 19.59 1,833 
SCORE ROA–RTOT 48.80 19.04 0.00 100.00 1,037 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used frontier equation. We clean ROA and RTOT, by 
removing extreme observations and then lost 1% of observations. ROA is the return on average assets. RTOT is the 
bank’s portfolio risk. SCORE ROA – RTOT is the previous “corrected” score which measure the relative position of a 
bank compared to the BPF of bank risk-return efficiency.   
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics for variables used in equation 2 (panel B sample, 2001–2011) 
Name Mean Stand. Dev. Min. Max. Nb. Obs. Expected sign 
SPREAD  85.50 145.59 - 405.06 562.79 1,585  
SCORE ROA – RTOT (%) 44.69 19.36 1.32 63.04 1,301 - 
RATINGBOND 4.30 1.37 1.00 11.2 1,585 + 
RATINGTRAD 4.62 1.39 2.00 13.70 1,511 + 
RATINGSOLID 6.04 2.03 2.75 13.00 1,552 + 
RTOT (%) 2.45 1.71 0.06 12.97 1,387 + 
LIQDEP (%) 52.55 34.27 4.56 205.23 1,477 - 
LEV 25.79 9.62 7.20 67.57 1,477 + 
TAMAX (%) 36.53 32.76 0.00 1.00 1,477 - 
MATURITY 4.24 3.29 0.25 32.93 1,585 + 
AMOUNT 18.00 2.22 12.15 25.27 1,585 - 
SPLIT (%) 0.91 0.89 0.00 6.2 1,181 + 
CYCLE -0.48 5.28 -18.84 12.52 1,457 - 
SPREAD is the difference in basis point between the bond yield at issuance and the yield of a same currency. SCORE is 
computed with ROA as a measure of bank profitability and RTOT, bank portfolio total risk as a measure of bank risk. 
RATINGBOND is the average of available bond ratings for each bond at each date. RATINGTRAD is the average of the issuer 
traditional ratings from Moody’s and Fitch. RATINGSOLID is the average of bank individual/financial ratings.  LIQDEP is the 
ratio of liquid assets to customer deposits and short term funding. LEV is the total liabilities to total equity ratio. TAMAX is 
the issuing bank’s total assets to the total assets of the largest bank in the sample in the year of the issuance date. MATURITY 
is the number of years until the bond redemption. AMOUNT is the natural logarithm of amount of issue in euros. SPLIT is the 
disagreement between Moody’s and Fitch bonds ratings. CYCLE is extract from the GDP with a HP filter.  
Table 7: Bond spread equation (whole sample period, 1,545 issues by 47 banks, GMM estimator) 
Model : !"#$%&! = ! + !!"#$%!(!),!(!) + !"!(!),!(!) + !!! + !"!(!) + !! 
(2001–2011, GMM estimator) 
Risk:  
Variables 
RATINGBOND 
RATING 
TRAD 
RATING 
SOLID 
RTOT Without RISK 
SCORE -234.39*** -155.07*** -80.65* -145.74*** -119.96** -98.71** -120.99*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) 
RISK -6.77 -1.54 10.68*** -3.37 1.43 4.86 - 
 (0.16) (0.77) (0.00) (0.40) (0.51) (0.39)  
LIQDEP -39.39 -48.40** -7.06 -0.51 -6.21 -2.98 -3.68 
 (0.12) (0.06) (0.74) (0.98) (0.78) (0.89) (0.86) 
LEV 1.85*** 1.85*** 1.98*** 1.95*** 1.92*** 1.86*** 1.88**** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TAMAX -82.34*** -67.71*** -53.33** -82.03*** -65.86*** -74.57*** -70.93*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MATURITY 2.48** 2.28* 3.00** 3.30*** 3.36*** 3.46*** 3.60*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AMOUNT -9.47*** -9.69*** 2.77 1.81 1.56 1.53 2.04 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.31) (0.38) (0.37) (0.25) 
SPLIT 12.75** 8.39 4.08 6.97 7.23 7.87* 7.09 
 (0.03) (0.16) (0.40) (0.14) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) 
CYCLE 9.48*** 7.28*** 3.75*** 5.20*** 4.56*** 4.67*** 4.62*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DUMCRISIS - 44.52*** 66.50*** 48.19*** 50.413*** 46.58*** 52.54*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DUMCOUNTRY NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
DUMCURRENCY NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Obs.  857 857 857 848 852 852 857 
R² 0.17 0.18 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
P-values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. SPREAD is the 
difference in basis point between the bond yield at issuance and the yield of a same currency. SCORE is computed with ROA as a 
measure of bank profitability and RTOT, bank portfolio total risk as a measure of bank risk. RATINGBOND is the average of 
available bond ratings for each bond at each date. RATINGTRAD is the average of the issuer traditional ratings from Moody’s and 
Fitch. RATINGSOLID is the average of bank individual/financial ratings.  LIQDEP is the ratio of liquid assets to customer deposits 
and short term funding. LEV is the total liabilities to total equity ratio. TAMAX is the issuing bank’s total assets to the total assets of 
the largest bank in the sample in the year of the issuance date. MATURITY is the number of years until the bond redemption. 
AMOUNT is the natural logarithm of amount of issue in euros. SPLIT is the disagreement between Moody’s and Fitch bonds ratings. 
CYCLE is extract from the GDP with a HP filter. DUMCRISIS is a dummy equals to 1 when the bond is issued during the financial 
crisis; 0 otherwise.   
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Table 8: Bond spread equation (sub-sample periods 2001-2007 and 2008-2011, GMM estimator) 
Model : !"#$%&! = ! + !!"#$%!(!),!(!) + !"!(!),!(!) + !!! + !"!(!) + !! 
(2001 – 2007, GMM estimator) 
Risk:  
Variables 
RATINGBOND 
RATING  
TRAD 
RATING  
SOLID 
RTOT Without RISK 
SCORE 683.18*** 416.98** 366.02* 436.96** 34.30 318.83* 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.87) (0.10) 
RISK -5.69 6.056 0.46 3.01 -26.33** - 
 (0.46) (0.25) (0.94) (0.26) (0.03)  
LIQDEP -88.88*** -15.41 -15.79 -23.56 -0.96 -14.48 
 (0.00) (0.54) (0.55) (0.38) (0.96) (0.57) 
LEV 2.61*** 0.41 0.71 0.47 1.30 0.71 
 (0.00) (0.62) (0.42) (0.62) (0.12) (0.41) 
TAMAX -22.10 -24.85 -33.92 -17.93 -42.92** -36.22 
 (0.55) (0.34) (0.28) (0.58) (0.05) (0.16) 
MATURITY 2.92* 4.14*** 3.65** 3.80*** 3.17** 4.33*** 
 (0.07) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) 
AMOUNT -15.35*** 0.77 0.10 0.05 0.92 0.54 
 (0.00) (0.73) (0.96) (0.98) (0.66) (0.82) 
SPLIT 8.25 5.78 7.24 6.11 2.39 6.91 
 (0.28) (0.29) (0.17) (0.23) (0.64) (0.20) 
CYCLE 13.97*** 2.81 2.95 2.55 4.07** 2.68 
 (0.00) (0.17 (0.15) (0.22) (0.05) (0.19) 
DUMCOUNTRY  NO YES YES YES YES YES 
DUMCURRENCY NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Obs.  561 561 553 560 560 561 
R² 0.19 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.69 
"
(2008 - 2011, GMM estimator) 
Risk:  
Variables 
RATINGBOND 
RATING 
TRAD 
RATING 
 SOLID 
RTOT Without RISK 
SCORE -142.54*** -8.98 -100.62* -96.14 -62.37 -103.93* 
 (0.01) (0.85) (0.09) (0.13) (0.33) (0.08) 
RISK 25.65*** 36.00*** 1.68 5.55 11.27 - 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.79) (0.26) (0.20)  
LIQDEP -47.04 -52.21 -24.94 -31.50 -20.98 -25.36 
 (0.25) (0.17) (0.52) (0.40) (0.58) (0.52) 
LEV 2.05*** 4.54*** 2.62*** 2.49** 1.80* 2.63** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) 
TAMAX 35.28 -6.43 -50.44 -22.46 -37.81 -55.32 
 (0.35) (0.90) (0.35) (0.64) (0.44) (0.32) 
MATURITY 1.01 2.56 4.92** 5.06** 5.11** 4.85** 
 (0.61) (0.21) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
AMOUNT -4.69 2.86 -0.06 -0.34 -0.74 0.18 
 (0.11) (0.35) (0.98) (0.91) (0.82) (0.95) 
SPLIT -32.95*** -37.54*** -12.61 -12.98 -13.19 -12.43 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) 
CYCLE 5.14*** 2.12 4.65*** 4.80*** 5.56*** 4.76*** 
 (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DUMCOUNTRY NO YES YES YES YES YES 
DUMCURRENCY NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Obs.  296 296 295 292 292 296 
R² 0.15 0.33 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.26 
P-values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. SPREAD is the 
difference in basis point between the bond yield at issuance and the yield of a same currency. SCORE is computed with ROA as a 
measure of bank profitability and RTOT, bank portfolio total risk as a measure of bank risk. RATINGBOND is the average of 
available bond ratings for each bond at each date. RATINGTRAD is the average of the issuer traditional ratings from Moody’s and 
Fitch. RATINGSOLID is the average of bank individual/financial ratings.  LIQDEP is the ratio of liquid assets to customer deposits 
and short term funding. LEV is the total liabilities to total equity ratio. TAMAX is the issuing bank’s total assets to the total assets of 
the largest bank in the sample in the year of the issuance date. MATURITY is the number of years until the bond redemption. 
AMOUNT is the natural logarithm of amount of issue in euros. SPLIT is the disagreement between Moody’s and Fitch bonds ratings. 
CYCLE is extract from the GDP with a HP filter.  
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APPENDIX  
Appendix A1: Ratings scales  
These tables indicate the numerical scales for credit ratings of Moody’s, Fitch and Standards & Poor’s (see Ronn and Verma (1987) and Pop and Pop (2012)). Bloomberg database provides 
outlook, we consider it in the ratings scale. If the outlook is positive, we subtract 0.2 to the numeric value. If the outlook is negative, we add 0.2 to the numeric value. If the outlook is neutral, the 
numeric value is unchanged. 
1. Traditional credit rating: Issuer and issue    2. Financial strength rating : Issuer 
 
 
 
 
 
Cardinal 
value 
Moody’s Fitch  S&P 
1 Aaa AAA AAA 
2 Aa1 AA+ AA+ 
3 Aa2 AA AA 
4 Aa3 AA- AA- 
5 A1 A+ A+ 
6 A2 A A 
7 A3 A- A- 
8 Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ 
9 Baa2 BBB BBB 
10 Baa3 BBB- BBB- 
11 Ba1 BB+ BB+ 
12 Ba2 BB BB 
13 Ba3 BB-  BB-  
14 B1 B+ B+ 
15 B2 B B 
16 B3 B- B- 
17 Caa1 CCC+ CCC+ 
18 Caa2 CCC CCC 
19 Caa3 CCC- CCC- 
20 Ca CC CC 
21 C C C 
 Outlook 
-0.2  Positive  
0  Neutral  
0.2  Negative  
Cardinal 
value 
MBFS 
Cardinal 
value 
FBIR 
1 A 1 A 
2 A-   
  2,5 A/B 
3 B+   
4 B 4 B 
5 B-   
  5,5 B/C 
6 C+   
7 C 7 C 
8 C-   
  8,5 C/D 
9 D+   
10 D 10 D 
11 D-   
  11,5 D/E 
12 E+   
13 E 13 E 
    
 Outlook  Outlook 
-0.2 Positive -0.2 Positive 
0 Neutral 0 Neutral 
0.2 Negative 0.2 Negative 
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Appendix A2: The evolution of the risk-return Best Practice Frontier (BPF) through year  
 
Figure 1: The Best-Practice risk-return frontier 
 
 
Appendix A3: Bond spread equation (whole sample period, 1,545 issues by 47 banks, OLS estimator) 
Model : !"#$%&! = ! + !!"#$%!(!),!(!) + !"!(!),!(!) + !!! + !"!(!) + !! 
(2001–2011, OLS estimator)  
Risk:  
Variables 
RATINGBOND 
RATING 
TRAD 
RATING 
SOLID 
RTOT 
Without 
RISK 
SCORE -288.12*** -202.64*** -127.25*** -178.51*** -145.90*** -109.71** -150.75*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
RISK -7.32 -3.18 9.10** -5.19 1.37 5.46 - 
 (0.13) (0.54) (0.03) (0.20) (0.53) (0.26)  
LIQDEP -71.59*** -74.27*** -13.57 -10.93 -15.91 -11.69 -12.42 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.50) (0.60) (0.44) (0.57) (0.54) 
LEV 1.40*** 1.48*** 1.36*** 1.31*** 1.28*** 1.15*** 1.26*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
TAMAX -53.54** -45.43* -48.73** -74.33*** -55.74*** -63.94*** -61.68*** 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
MATURITY 2.04* 2.00* 2.85** 3.07** 3.17** 3.54*** 3.40*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
AMOUNT -10.59*** -10.42*** 2.08 1.27 1.07 1.55 1.52 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.25) (0.48) (0.55) (0.39) (0.40) 
SPLIT 12.27** 9.25 5.54 8.05* 8.26* 8.69* 8.13* 
 (0.03) (0.12) (0.26) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) 
CYCLE 10.60*** 8.42*** 4.99*** 6.22*** 5.39*** 5.28*** 5.52*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DUMCRISIS - 34.66*** 58.84*** 44.78*** 47.42*** 45.59*** 48.78*** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DUMCOUNTRY NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
DUMCURRENCY NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Obs.  857 857 857 8.48 852 857 857 
R² 0.18 0.19 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 
P-values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. SPREAD is the 
difference in basis point between the bond yield at issuance and the yield of a same currency. SCORE is computed with ROA as a 
measure of bank profitability and RTOT, bank portfolio total risk as a measure of bank risk RATINGBOND is the average of 
available bond ratings for each bond at each date. RATINGTRAD is the average of the issuer traditional ratings from Moody’s and 
Fitch. RATINGSOLID is the average of bank individual/financial ratings.  LIQDEP is the ratio of liquid assets to customer deposits 
and short term funding. LEV is the total liabilities to total equity ratio. TAMAX is the issuing bank’s total assets to the total assets of 
the largest bank in the sample in the year of the issuance date. MATURITY is the number of years until the bond redemption. 
AMOUNT is the natural logarithm of amount of issue in euros. SPLIT is the disagreement between Moody’s and Fitch bonds ratings. 
CYCLE is extract from the GDP with a HP filter. DUMCRISIS is a dummy equals to 1 when the bond is issued during the financial 
crisis; 0 otherwise.  
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Appendix A4: Bond spread equation (distress and sound economic periods, GMM estimator) 
Model : !"#$%&! = ! + !!"#$%!(!),!(!) + !"!(!),!(!) + !!! + !"!(!) + !! 
"(Distress economic period, GMM estimator) 
Risk:  
Variables 
RATINGBOND RATING TRAD RATING SOLID RTOT Without RISK 
SCORE -211.89*** -140.65*** -175.42*** -152.56*** -110.36* -162.37*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) 
RISK 5.21 11.04* -0.95 5.85 11.83* - 
 (0.40) (0.10) (0.85) (0.12) (0.10)  
LIQDEP 6.79 29.93 27.93 9.24 21.44 11.71 
 (0.86) (0.42) (0.45) (0.80) (0.56) (0.74) 
LEV 2.20*** 4.00*** 3.49*** 3.42*** 2.70*** 3.16*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TAMAX -71.35** -105.34*** -122.75*** -87.59** -109.91*** -97.23*** 
 (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
MATURITY 1.43 2.64* 3.55** 3.31** 3.71** 2.81** 
 (0.34) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
AMOUNT -3.20 5.19* 3.28 2.71 2.29 3.49 
 (0.27) (0.09) (0.29) (0.38) (0.46) (0.25) 
SPLIT 4.26 3.29 6.44 6.41 9.40 8.56 
 (0.57) (0.70) (0.38) (0.39) (0.21) (0.24) 
CYCLE 7.41*** 4.86*** 5.74*** 5.29*** 5.80*** 5.51*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DUMCOUNTRY NO YES YES YES YES YES 
DUMCURRENCY NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Obs.  445 445 440 440 440 440 
R² 0.13 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 
#
(Sound economic period, GMM estimator) 
Risk:  
Variables 
RATINGBOND RATING TRAD RATING SOLID RTOT Without RISK 
SCORE 1470.47*** 558.19** 420.20 458.43* 541.46 491.12** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.12) (0.08) (0.17) (0.04) 
RISK -11.83 3.67 -5.59 -0.86 4.29 - 
 (0.14) (0.31) (0.35) (0.74) (0.83)  
LIQDEP -60.99* -43.74** -44.54** -41.07** -44.56* -41.56** 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) 
LEV 1.82* 0.57 0.89 1.03 0.61 0.73 
 (0.07) (0.34) (0.17) (0.36) (0.41) (0.27) 
TAMAX -42.81 0.08 -15.38 -13.20 -5.34 -7.68 
 (0.22) (0.99) (0.47) (0.60) (0.80) (0.69) 
MATURITY 2.42 0.28 0.16 0.24 0.44 0.39 
 (0.32) (0.89) (0.94) (0.91) (0.84) (0.85) 
AMOUNT -18.50*** -1.25 -1.52 -1.32 -1.29 -1.37 
 (0.00) (0.56) (0.48) (0.54) (0.54) (0.52) 
SPLIT 1.03 2.90 3.44 2.63 3.85 3.76 
 (0.92) (0.64) (0.59) (0.70) (0.53) (0.53) 
CYCLE 8.91*** 3.94* 3.43 3.59* 3.56* 3.58* 
 (0.00) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
DUMCOUNTRY NO YES YES YES YES YES 
DUMCURRENCY NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Obs.  412 412 408 412 412 412 
R² 0.25 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 
P-values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. SPREAD is the 
difference in basis point between the bond yield at issuance and the yield of a same currency. SCORE is computed with ROA as 
a measure of bank profitability and RTOT, bank portfolio total risk as a measure of bank risk RATINGBOND is the average of 
available bond ratings for each bond at each date. RATINGTRAD is the average of the issuer traditional ratings from Moody’s 
and Fitch. RATINGSOLID is the average of bank individual/financial ratings.  LIQDEP is the ratio of liquid assets to customer 
deposits and short term funding. LEV is the total liabilities to total equity ratio. TAMAX is the issuing bank’s total assets to the 
total assets of the largest bank in the sample in the year of the issuance date. MATURITY is the number of years until the bond 
redemption. AMOUNT is the natural logarithm of amount of issue in euros. SPLIT is the disagreement between Moody’s and 
Fitch bonds ratings. CYCLE is extract from the GDP with a HP filter. 
